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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 President George W. Bush signed the Healthy Forests Restoration 
Act into law on December 3, 2003 as the cornerstone of his Healthy Forest 
Initiative and on the heels of a severe fire season in 2002.1  The Act was 
promulgated in noted response to the upward trend in the number of fires, 
fire severity, and acreage involved in each fire, and its defined purpose 
was to “reduce wildfire risk to communities” and watersheds.2  By 
implementing a suite of programs and initiatives aimed at expediting and 
funding forest projects, the Act’s primary intentions were to reduce 
hazardous fuels and address threats to overall forest health.3  Since the 
Act’s passage almost 16 years ago, the United States continues to see a 
steady increase in the number of acres burned each year, the average size 
of each fire, and the annual cost of wildland firefighting.4  
 Fire suppression cost exceeded 2 billion dollars for the U.S. Forest 
Service in 2017, making it the most expensive year on record.  Between 
January 1, 2017 and November 24, 2017, there were 54,858 wildfires 
recorded in the United States, burning over 9,152,458 acres.5  The 
economic and health ramifications of the 2017 fire season prompted 
Congress to pass provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018 
addressing forest fire management.6  This note will examine the applicable 
provisions passed in the 2018 spending Act, with the intention of 
identifying the likeliness that its enactment will significantly affect the 
proliferation of wildfires.  It will also identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the provisions in the Act.  Ultimately, it will conclude that 
while the spending provisions within the Act, which assure adequate 
funding for the foreseeable future, are positive for fire suppression and 
forest management practices, the substantive riders contained within the 
                                                                 
1. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003: Summary of 
Implementation Actions, FOREST AND RANGELANDS, https://www. 
forestsandrangelands.gov/resources/overview/hfra-implementation12-2004.shtml 
(last visited April 30, 2019).  
2. 16 U.S.C. § 6501 (2018). 
3. Id.  
4. Paige Blankenbuehler & Brooke Warren, Why Western wildfires are 
getting more expensive, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.hcn.org/ 
issues/49.21/infographic-why-western-wildfires-are-getting-more-expensive. 
5. Id. 
6. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. 
(2018).  
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Act are largely shortsighted and will be unsuccessful in decreasing fire 
suppression cost and mitigating fire severity and size.   
 This examination will begin in Section II by briefly outlining the 
110-year history of forest fire suppression in the United States.  
Additionally, Section II will highlight the evolving understanding of fire’s 
role in forest ecology over the same period.  Section III will define the 
current ecological state of forests in the western United States and quantify 
the scope of the problem facing forest managers throughout the West.  
Section IV will evaluate the controlling Acts most relevant to this 
examination: the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Healthy Forest 
Restoration Act (“HFRA”), the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and 
Enhancement Act (“FLAME”), and the applicable fire provisions in the 2014 
Farm Bill.  Discussion and examination of the recently passed provisions 
in the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act will follow.  Finally, Section 
V will analyze where the culmination of these controlling Acts leaves 
wildfire policy in 2019 and the likelihood that these Acts will be able to 
affect change in the modern wildfire regime.  
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The pertinent history of the Forest Service’s storied relationship 
with wildfire suppression began in 1910.7  In the fire season of 1910, 
nearly five million acres of Forest Service lands were scorched in a single 
event that caused the death of 78 firefighters.8  This fire season marked the 
beginning of the Forest Service’s policy of extinguishing all fires as soon 
as possible, a job at which they became quite proficient.9  By 1935, the 
United States Forest Service established a policy of controlling all fires by 
10:00 a.m., and the Forest Service largely sought to prevent all forest fires 
                                                                 
7. Jamison Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the 
Wildland/Urban Interface, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 225 n.8 (2008) 
(citing see generally STEPHEN J. PYNE, YEAR OF FIRES: THE STORY OF THE GREAT 
FIRES OF 1910 (2001); STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE (1982)). 
8. Id. 
9.  Id. (citing Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful 
What You Wish For: The Legacy of Smokey Bear, 5 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY 73, 74 
(2007)). 
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until the late 1970s.10  The result of these efforts was impressive, and the 
proficiency at which the Forest Service extinguished forest fires was 
unparalleled.  In 1900, the annual acreage burned in the western United 
States was 30 million acres—between 1935 and 1979 that average was 5 
million acres.11  Even though the ecological benefits of sporadic low 
intensity fire were well known nearly three decades prior, the Forest 
Service didn’t adapt its fire suppression policy until 1995, when it began 
taking a more comprehensive approach to fire management, which 
employed mechanical thinning, prescribed fire, and selective fire 
suppression to remove excessive forest fuels.12  
 
III. CURRENT ECOLOGICAL STATUS OF WESTERN FORESTS 
  
 Though 57 percent of the forest in the United States are privately 
owned, of the 19.6 percent owned by the federal government, a sizable 
portion are in the Western United States.13  In addition to these  federal 
forest reserves, state and tribal forests make up 23 percent of the United 
States forests and are managed under a paradigm similar to that of the  
federal forests.14  The overall health of these forests is best summarized by 
the 2013 Western Governors Association’s Report to then Secretary of 
Agriculture Vilsack: “Federal forest lands throughout the West are 
experiencing serious environmental stress that affects the health and 
vitality of these ecosystems.  They are overgrown; they exhibit all the 
symptoms of an unhealthy ecosystem; and they demand urgent 
attention.”15     
                                                                 
10. Jesse B. Davis, Comment: The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy 
Policy Choices in Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVTL. L. 1209, 1211 (2004).  
11. Id.  
12. Id. 
13. Michael Goergen, James Harding, Carlton Owen, Mark Rey, & Lynn 
Scarlett, The State and Future of U.S. Forestry and Forest Industry- Workshop Report 
and Recommendations, 15 (May 2013), http://usendowment. 
org/images/Forest_Sector_Report_--_FINAL_9.5.13.pdf (last visited April 27, 2018) 
(reporting for the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities, with funding 
provided by USDA Forest Service, State, and Private Forestry). 
14. Id. (citing data originally obtained from the US Forest Service 
contained in the report’s graph). 
15. Id. (citing Western Governors’ Association, “Western Governors 
request private sector be utilized to improve federal forest management,” Letter to 
Secretary Vilsack, April 15, 2013, https://healthyforests.org/2013/04/western-
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 This report identifies three factors that are influencing the overall 
health of  federal forests.  Anecdotally, these three factors are likely also 
affecting state and tribal forests in a comparable manner. The factors 
identified by the report are: (1) climate change; (2) forest loss due to 
fragmentation on non-federal lands; and (3) a “constrained federal 
financial capacity and societal support.”16  The report notes that warming 
temperatures and shifting weather patterns are contributing to increased 
frequency and intensity of fires, proliferation of insect infestations, loss of 
water quality and availability, and changes in composition of vegetation.17  
Fragmentation occurs as an increasing human population continues to 
expand into the wildland urban interface (“WUI”), which places strain on 
the forest and makes addressing potential forest fires more complicated.18  
Finally, the report discusses the recent diversion of funds from forest 
management practices to fire suppression efforts, which is a critical factor 
and detrimental to the future of forest health.19  Beyond these three 
overarching factors, the challenges posed by invasive species is also 
discussed.20  The report concludes that  federal forests will continue to 
experience severe fire outbreaks.  
 
IV. CONTROLLING ACTS 
 
A. National Environmental Protection Act 
 
 Many of the statutory acts that shape wildfire policy in the United 
States are informed by or in response NEPA; therefore, a brief 
understanding of its purpose and substantive provisions is prudent.  NEPA 
was passed on January 1, 1970 with a sweeping statement of purpose 
                                                                 
governors-private-sector-should-be-utilized-to-improve-federal-forest-
management/). 
16. Id.  
17. Id. (citing to USDA, Resource Planning Act Assessment, 2010; 
USDA, National Report on Sustainable Forests, 2012; see also Donald McKenzie, 
David L. Peterson, & Jeremy J. Littell, Global warming and stress complexes in 
forests of western North America, in ANDRZEJ BYTNEROWICZ, ET AL., WILDLAND 
FIRES AND AIR POLLUTION, DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 8, 638 Ch. 
15 (2009). 
18. Id.  
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 17. 
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recognizing “man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the 
natural environment” and setting out a policy of using “all practicable 
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a 
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Americans.”21  A list of objectives to 
which the government hopes to preserve follows the statement of purpose.  
These lofty goals aim to preserve, among other elements, biological 
diversity, natural esthetics, and a healthful human environment.22 
 NEPA mandates agencies prepare a report or recommendation on 
“proposals for legislation and other major  federal action significantly 
affecting the human environment.”23  The report required under NEPA 
does not “impose a substantive duty on agencies to mitigate adverse 
environmental effects or to include in each environmental impact 
statement a fully developed mitigation plan,” but it does ensure that 
agencies “will take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences” and 
guarantee “broad public dissemination of relevant information.”24  In 
general, NEPA promulgates a set of rules that require an agency to prepare 
an environmental assessment (“EA”), and, if necessary, an environmental 
impact statement (“EIS”), that considers the reasonably foreseeable 
environmental effects of a proposed major federal action and assesses 
multiple alternative actions, including the alternative of no action.25  
Numerous lawsuits challenging the scope of an EIS or an EA have 
judicially defined the parameters of NEPA evaluations, and the size and 
relative scope of an EIS or an EA has greatly expanded over time.  This 
expansion is a direct result of NEPA litigation and agency wariness to 
having its eventual decision overturned or stayed because of a finding of 
inadequacy in the NEPA process.26  Recent forest fire and hazardous fuels 
                                                                 
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(a) (2018). 
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(b) (2018). 
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(c) (2018). 
24. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333 
(1989). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
26. SANDRA B. ZELLMER & JAN G. LAITOS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
RESOURCE LAW, 59 (2014) (noting that significant percentage of environmental 
litigation is brought under NEPA and that “the sheer volume of each EIS has increased 
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reduction policy has been largely aimed at finding ways in which the 
NEPA timeframe can be shortened or eliminated. 
 
B. National Forest Management Act 
 
 Congress passed NFMA in the early 1970s as an attempt to exert 
control over the Forest Service's discretion.27  Composed of two primary 
parts, the Act sought to implement large scale planning over distinct forest 
units.  First, the Act requires the Forest Service to develop Land and 
Resource Management Plans (“LRMPs”) to guide and govern all activities 
on a distinct forest unit.28  These plans are to be developed with extensive 
public input and revised every 15 years, unless conditions in the unit 
significantly change requiring review on a more frequent basis.29  In 
addition to the requirement that the Forest Service develop LRMPs, the 
NFMA also set out specific substantive criteria to assure each forest unit 
is managed in a manner that protects forest resources while allowing 
timber harvest.30  LRMPs also must be promulgated in accordance with 
NEPA.31  
 
C. Healthy Forest Restoration Act 
 
 Enacted on December 3, 2003, the stated purpose of the HFRA 
was to: 
 
[I]mprove the capacity of the Secretary of Agriculture and 
the Secretary of the Interior to conduct hazardous fuels 
reduction projects on National Forest System lands and 
Bureau of Land Management lands aimed at protecting 
communities, watersheds and wildfire, to enhance efforts 
to protect watersheds and address threats to forest and 
                                                                 
dramatically, as agencies attempt to ‘bulletproof’ their analyses by making them 
longer and more detailed.”).   
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1600-1604 (2018). 
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f). 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f). 
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3). 
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1). 
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range land health, including catastrophic wildfire, across 
the landscape and for other purposes.32 
 
While HFRA sets out provisions under five sections, the most pertinent 
section to this commentary is Title I. The meat of Title I is effectively a 
codification of the Western Governors’ Association’s ten-year forestry 
strategy plan.33  In 2000, the Association drafted the original forestry 
management strategy, which was developed in conjunction with public 
interest groups and federal agencies.34  Much like the eventual goals of the 
HFRA, the original aim of the ten-year plan was to improve “fire 
prevention and suppression programs, reduce hazardous fuels, restore fire 
adaptive ecosystems, and promote community assistance.”35  As the 
subsequent Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 only amended Title 
I of the HFRA and most wildfire suppression efforts are completed under 
Title I’s provisions, Title II – Title VI will not be discussed in this 
examination.  However, continued support, both politically and 
financially, for the entirety of the HFRA is critically important to gaining 
an advantage on western wildfires, as the Act comprehensively aids in the 
furtherance of a robust forest industry and healthy forest ecosystems.  
Notably, Title II of the Act provided direct support to overcome economic 
and information barriers hindering the use and production of the woody 
biomass created from fuels reduction projects, which ultimately addresses 
a fundamental problem of all initiatives designed to aid in forest 
management—the lack of viable timber markets in the Western United 
States.36   
 The main objective of Title I of the Act is prioritization of 
hazardous fuel reduction projects and a streamlined NEPA analysis.  By 
simultaneously identifying projects with the highest likelihood of 
successful intervention and then expediting NEPA analysis by shortcutting 
                                                                 
32. Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-48, 117 Stat. 
1887, 1887 (2003). 
33. Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Healthy Forests Restoration Act – Will It 
Really Protect Homes and Communities, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 639, 646 (2004). 
34. Id.   
35. Id. (citing to Western Governors Association, A Collaborative 
Approach to Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment 10-
Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation (May 2002), https://www. 
forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/resources/plan/11-23-en.pdf). 
36. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6531 (repealed in late 2018 subsequent to the drafting 
of this examination. Pub. L. No. 115-334 (Dec. 20, 2018)).  
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certain NEPA requirements, the HFRA aimed to produce action by 
moving projects from proposal to actual work on the ground in a matter of 
months not years.  The HFRA—in five parts—outlines the prioritization 
of federal lands involved in hazardous fuel reduction projects: 
  
(1) Federal lands in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) 
in at risk communities;   
(2) condition class 3  Federal land, in such proximity to a 
municipal water supply system or a stream feeding such a 
system within a municipal watershed that a significant 
risk exists that a fire disturbance event would have 
adverse effects on the water quality of the municipal water 
supply or the maintenance of the system, including a risk 
to water quality posed by erosion following such a fire 
disturbance event;  
(3) condition class 2  Federal land located within fire 
regime I, fire regime II, or fire regime III, in such 
proximity to a municipal water supply system or a stream 
feeding such a system within a municipal watershed that 
a significant risk exists that a fire disturbance event would 
have adverse effects on the water quality of the municipal 
water supply or the maintenance of the system, including 
a risk to water quality posed by erosion following such a 
fire disturbance event;  
(4) Federal land on which windthrow or blowdown, ice 
storm damage, the existence of an epidemic of disease or 
insects, or the presence of such an epidemic on 
immediately adjacent land and the imminent risk it will 
spread, poses a significant threat to an ecosystem 
component, or forest or rangeland resource, on the  
Federal land or adjacent non- Federal land; and 
(5) Federal land not covered by paragraphs (1) through (4) 
that contains threatened and endangered species habitat, 
if— 
(A) natural fire regimes on that land are identified 
as being important for, or wildfire is identified as 
a threat to, an endangered species, a threatened 
species, or habitat of an endangered species or 
threatened species in a species recovery plan 
  PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW   Vol. 41 88 
prepared under section 1533 of this title, or a 
notice published in the Federal Register 
determining a species to be an endangered 
species or a threatened species or designating 
critical habitat; 
(B) the authorized hazardous fuel reduction 
project will provide enhanced protection from 
catastrophic wildfire for the endangered species, 
threatened species, or habitat of the endangered 
species or threatened species; and 
(C) the Secretary complies with any applicable 
guidelines specified in any management or 
recovery plan described in subparagraph (A).37 
 
Any projects that fall within these parameters are then to be subjected to a 
modified NEPA analysis. 
 One of the primary objectives of the HFRA was to streamline 
NEPA evaluations; therefore, enabling projects to complete the necessary 
EAs and begin implementation in a shorter timeframe—months instead of 
years.  Except for the NEPA alterations noted below, projects 
implemented under the HFRA are still subject to review in accordance 
with NEPA and other applicable laws, which means that an EA or an EIS 
must be issued before a project can begin.38  The HFRA truncates the 
NEPA timeline through four primary tools: 1) the NEPA analysis under 
the HFRA framework requires fewer proposed alternatives be analyzed for 
projects at large; 2) the requirements for proposed alternatives are even 
further reduced for projects in the WUI; 3) the HFRA places limits on the 
public comment period; and 4) the HFRA is a limited waiver of the 
Appeals Reform Act, meaning it reduces the accessibility to appeals and 
judicial actions.39 
 First, the reviewing agency is not required to consider multiple 
alternatives to the action presented.40  Whereas, under a regular NEPA 
evaluation a judicially implied three to five alternatives are required in 
                                                                 
37. 16 U.S.C. § 6512(a) (2018). 
38. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(a) (2018). 
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 6514-15; 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2004). 
40. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(c).  
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addition to the proposed action and “no action” alternative,41 the HFRA 
only requires the analysis of the “proposed agency action,” a “no action” 
alternative, and one additional action alternative.42  The review of the one 
supplemental alternative is only required if it is proposed during the 
collaborative scoping process and “meets the purpose and need of the 
project, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Council of 
Environmental Quality.”43  Second, the requirements to review 
alternatives are further reduced if the proposed fuels reduction project is 
conducted within the WUI (only the proposed action and one alternative 
are to be analyzed in the EA or EIS) and even less restrictive if within one 
and a half miles of an at-risk community (no alternative is required, the 
EA or EIS must only assess the proposed action).44  
 The HFRA shortened the time frame for the public to evaluate and 
comment on proposed HFRA projects and severely restricted public 
comments and objections to approved projects; therefore, reducing the 
possibility of delays in project implementation due to lengthy comment 
periods and extended appeals.  Unlike a standard NEPA public comment 
period, which is open to all who wish to comment, both verbally and in 
writing, comments under the HFRA are only accepted in writing during a 
limited time period.45  As soon as comments have been taken and the 
Forest Service has considered their validity, draft decision documents are 
released and only those parties that submitted specific comments during 
the comment period can object during the pre-decisional administrative 
review process.46  Additionally, objections can only be made during this 
pre-decisional process on issues raised during the comment period.  After 
the agency issues its final decision, appeals will only be heard from those 
parties involved in the original development of the plan and who submitted 
written comments and objections.47  Much like the access to agency 
                                                                 
41. Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 648. 
42. Id.  
43. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(c)(1)(C). 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(d). 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 6514; 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2013). 
46. Katie Hoover et al., Forest Management Provisions Enacted in the 
115th Congress, H.R. REP. NO. R45696 at 7, 115th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Summary 
of 115th Congressional Action] (citing to 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2018)).  
47. Id. (citing Department of Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act (“Appeals Reform Act”), Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 
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appeals, judicial review of an agency’s administrative decisions is also 
limited in time and scope under the HFRA.48  In passing the HFRA, 
Congress hoped to implement a process in which fuels reduction projects 
were conceived, reviewed, and implemented in the shortest amount of time 
possible.  
 Critics of the HFRA pointed to several perceived inadequacies in 
the Act, which they asserted would keep it from fulfilling its stated 
purpose. First, detractors claimed the HFRA applied a one-size-fits-all 
approach to forest management by assuming that manual thinning was the 
best management practice for all forest types and in all situations, which 
does not correlate with modern understanding of the healthy role fire can 
play in forest health.49  This criticism was largely unfounded because the 
Act sought to implement projects in the WUI and other areas where 
controlled natural burns and prescribed burns had limited applicability, 
and the term “appropriate tools” in the Acts definition of “Authorized  
Hazardous Fuels Reductions Projects” was interpreted to include 
prescribed burns and use of naturally occurring wildland fire.50  Second, 
critics found it unlikely that the Forest Service could take advantage of the 
truncated NEPA review to green light time-dependent forest projects, such 
as beetle kills and blowdowns that have a limited window for 
economically productive harvesting, which could leave only large fire-
resistant old growth trees as the primary marketable timber within a project 
area.51  While the provisions of the Act as originally passed appeared to 
substantially define and limit the scope of qualifying projects to those that 
fit the purpose of the Act, opponents of the HFRA claimed its potential 
pitfall was that it could be used as a “logging loop hole” (i.e. allowing 
logging of mature marketable trees under the auspices of thinning in places 
otherwise not able to be logged).52   
 Critically, the Act as originally passed failed to adequately 
provide for the abundance of land in the growing WUI that is not under  
federal control, land that is largely responsible for the increasing cost of 
                                                                 
1374, 1419 (1992); see also 36 C.F.R. § 218.1–218.16 for updated objection 
procedure).  
48. 16 U.S.C.A. 6516.   
49. Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 650–651.  
50. Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 46 at 5 n. 26. 
51. Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 654–657. 
52. Id. at 643. 
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fighting wildfires and economic loss resulting from those fires.53  The Act 
did not provide for collaborative efforts with state and local municipalities 
or transfer of funds to address those areas of the WUI outside of  federal 
control.  Finally, the Act’s success is reliant on adequate funding provided 
to carry out the projects it promotes; therefore, during bad fire seasons, the 
fuels management funds are usually the first taken to support suppression 
efforts.  
 
D. Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement Act 
 
 FLAME was enacted on October 30, 2009 and statutorily required 
the development of a cohesive wildfire management strategy.54  As a 
collaborative effort between the Department of Interior and the 
Department of Agriculture, the strategy was to be completed within one 
year of the enactment.55  The Act’s vision for a cohesive strategy was “to 
safely and effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where 
allowable; manage our natural resources; and as a Nation, live with 
wildland fire.”56  Seven criteria were to be assessed and addressed in the 
final management strategy. Those criteria are: 
   
(1) the identification of the most cost-effective means for 
allocating fire management budget resources; 
(2) the reinvestment in non-fire programs by the Secretary 
of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture; 
                                                                 
53.      Tania Schoennagel et al., Adapt to more wildfire in western North 
American forests as climate changes, 114(18) PNAS 4582, 4583 (May 2017), 
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/18/4582.full.pdf (“Between 1990 and 2010, 
almost 2 million homes were added in the 11 states of the Western United States 
increasing the WUI by 24%. . . . Since 1990, the average annual number of structures 
lost to wildfire has increased by 300%, with a significant step up since 2008. . . .  
Because of the people and property values at risk, WUI fires fundamentally change 
the tactics and cost of fire suppression as compared with fighting remote fires and 
account for as much as 95% of suppression costs.” (internal citations omitted)). 
54. 43 U.S.C. 1748(b) (2018). 
55. Id. 
56.  U.S. Dep’t of Interior & U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Building a Cohesive 
Strategy, FORESTS AND RANGELANDS, www.forestsandrangelands.gov/ 
strategy/building.shtml (last visited March 22, 2019) [hereinafter Building a Cohesive 
Strategy]. 
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(3) employing the appropriate management response to 
wildfires; 
(4) assessing the level of risk to communities; 
(5) the allocation of hazardous fuels reduction funds 
based on the priority of hazardous fuels reduction 
projects; 
(6) assessing the impacts of climate change on the 
frequency and severity of wildfire; and 
(7) studying the effects of invasive species on wildfire 
risk.57 
 
Since the Act’s passage it has had significant support from the Western 
Governors’ Association, which was the group responsible for the 
formulating the documents behind the HFRA.  In 2016, the Governors’ 
Policy Statement called for full implementation of FLAME’s provisions 
and funding to provide for the Act’s full implementation.58  
 The main thrust of the Act was to create a National Cohesive 
Wildland Fire Management Strategy.59  The strategy dictated three phases 
of implementation.  Phase I was the blueprinting process, which aimed at 
establishing the primary goals and structure of the strategy.60  
Implementation of Phase 1 involved cohesive strategy planning such that 
“the wildland fire strategy would not be limited to  federal lands, but would 
consider the needs of all lands and balance regional needs and perspectives 
with national planning.”61  Aside from creating a strategic framework for 
FLAME’s implementation, Phase I identified three primary goals: 
“creating resilient landscapes, fire adapted communities, and more 
effective response to wildfire.”62  Phase II required the completion of 
regional assessments, which evaluated “landscape elements, ecological 
processes, and human values of local resources.”63  Phase III saw the 
                                                                 
57.  43 U.S.C. § 1748b(b)(2012).  
58.  Policy Resolution 2016-06: Wildland Fire Management and Resilient 
Landscapes, WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://westgov.org/images/editor/2016-
06_Wildland_Fire_Management.pdf (last visited March 22, 2019) [hereinafter Policy 
Resolution 2016-06].  
59.  Id. 
60.  Building a Cohesive Strategy, supra note 56.  
61.  Id. 
62.  Policy Resolution 2016-06, supra note 58. 
63.  Building a Cohesive Strategy, supra note 56. 
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creation of science-based risk analysis reports and action plans, and this 
phase culminated in the creation of the National Cohesive Wildland Fire 
Management Strategy.64  The final plan is credited as a collaborative effort 
by “[f]ederal, state, local, and tribal governments, non-governmental 
partners, and public stakeholders.”65  The final National Strategy:  
 
establishes broad, strategic national-level direction as a 
foundation for implementing programs and activities 
across the nation.  Based on a landscape-level 
collaborative approach, describing how the Nation can 
focus future efforts in making strategic investments to 
reduce the severe effects of wildfire on areas of high 
risk.66 
 
E. Agricultural Act of 2014 
 
 The Agricultural Act of 2014 (“2014 Farm Bill”) contained 
several provisions to increase the pace and scope at which agencies could 
implement forest, watershed, and rangeland restorations.67  These 
provisions amended the HFRA in two primary ways.  Most notably, the  
2014 Farm Bill created a 3000-acre categorical exclusion (“Farm Bill 
CE”) for treatment of insect or disease infestations, which excluded the 
proposed project from NEPA analysis and instead imposed a collaborative 
review process.68  Additionally, these provisions gave states 60 days to 
request that the Forest Service designate landscape-scale areas 
experiencing, or at risk of experiencing an insect or disease epidemic.69  
45.6 million acres of National Forest system lands across 35 states were 
designated as eligible for CE projects under the 2014 Farm Bill.70  
                                                                 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67. Agricultural Act of 2014, 7 U.S.C. § 9001 (2014).  
68.  U.S. Forest Service, Farm Bill Insect and Disease Designations, 
Key Messages, U.S. FOREST SERV. (May 19, 2014), https://www.sierraforestlegacy. 
org/Resources/Conservation/ProjectsPlans/FarmBillCE/FS_Key_Messages_FarmBil
lCE.pdf.  
69. Id.; see also Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 
46, at 8.   
70. Id.  
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However, designation under these provisions was not a guarantee that 
work would be carried out on the affected areas, only that the areas were 
available for further evaluation and potential implementation of the Farm 
Bill CE. Additionally, the 2014 Farm Bill did not appropriate any funds 
for these projects.71  Projects implemented in the designated areas, which 
aimed to use the categorical exclusion, were to meet the following 
requirements: (1) maximize the retention of old growth and large trees, (2) 
consider the best available science, (3) be limited to areas within the 
designated disease or infestation area or the WUI, (4) exclude areas in 
Wilderness, wilderness study areas, or areas where the removal of 
vegetation is restricted or prohibited, (5) prohibit the establishment of 
permanent roads, and (6) decommission any temporary roads constructed 
for the project within three years of project completion.72  
 The Farm Bill CE was recently challenged in Center for 
Biological Diversity, et. al. v. Eli Ilano, et. al.73  This case involves the 
application of the Farm Bill CE in the Tahoe National Forest for a logging 
project aimed at combating disease and beetle infestation.74  Opponents of 
the project claimed that the Forest Service did not properly evaluate the 
projects potential effect on the California spotted owl and that the project 
should have been subject to NEPA evaluation.75  The court found that 
“because no NEPA review was required for the area designation, and 
because the extraordinary circumstances analysis of the effects of the . . . 
[p]roject on the California spotted owl was adequate, summary judgment 
is granted to the defendants.”76  The case is currently on appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the court’s 
decision will have far reaching ramifications on the legality of future CE’s.  
 
F. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018  
 
 In response to the unprecedented fire season of 2017, Congress 
amended the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 (“2018 
Appropriations Act”) to include several provisions aimed at addressing the 
                                                                 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. 261 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
74. Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 1071.  
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wildland fire situation in the United States.77  Congress passed the Act and 
it was signed into law by President Donald Trump in March of 2018.78  
The Act contains provisions aimed at addressing the funding shortage that 
occurs when the Forest Service and other agencies are faced with extensive 
fire suppression costs that exceed their budget line item.79  Additionally, 
the Act also contains substantive provisions that amend the HFRA and 
institute an additional CE for hazardous fuels reduction projects under 
3000 acres.80  This section will address the spending provisions contained 
in the Act first, and then turn to the more complicated substantive 
provisions.   
 
1. Spending Provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2018 
 
 As wildfires have become larger, more intense, and increasingly 
in contact with the expanding WUI, the cost of battling these blazes has 
correspondingly increased.  The spending provisions contained in the 2018 
Appropriations Act are aimed at stemming the chronic underfunding of 
wildfire suppression efforts in the United States.  As an example of agency 
underfunding: “the 2015 budget provided funding for 70 % of the 10-year 
average of wildfire suppression costs,” at a time when projected costs were 
far exceeding that average.81  When wildfire suppression costs are 
underestimated and underfunded, the agencies charged with controlling 
these blazes engage in the practice of “fire borrowing.”82  “Fire borrowing” 
and its resulting problems are summarized as follows:  
 
The practice of diverting money earmarked for wildfire 
prevention activities to wildfire suppression activities, 
and it has created a vicious cycle in wildfire management. 
                                                                 
77. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018: Wildfire Suppression 
Funding and Forest Management Activities Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. §§ 
101−212 (2018) [hereinafter H.R. 1625]. 
78.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, 132 
Stat. 348 (2018).  
79. H.R. 1625 § 102−103. 
80. H.R. 1625 § 605. 
81. Brian Bona, The Wildfire Crisis: How the Federal Government Has 
Tried To Stop The Burn, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVT. L. & POL’Y 1081, 1084 (2016). 
82.  Id. 
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The agencies cannot adequately minimize the wildfires 
using reduction techniques because all their funds go to 
emergency firefighting. Since the agencies are unable to 
fully engage in preventative measures, the wildfires 
become increasingly worse in subsequent years, which 
drives up the cost of fighting the fires and forces the 
agencies to rely further on ‘fire-borrowing.’83   
 
This chronic underfunding of forest fire suppression has continually 
threatened the efficacy of agency actions aimed at solving or mitigating 
the increasing wildfire problem.  No matter how effective forest 
management plans and practices might be, if their funding is diverted and 
they are not implemented to their fullest extent, they will never be able to 
mitigate the increasing fire danger.      
 The 2018 Appropriations Act makes a significant commitment to 
long-term funding of forest fire suppression and wildfire disaster funding.  
Under the division of the Act titled Wildfire Suppression Funding and 
Forest Management Activities Act, Title I, Wildfire and Disaster Funding 
Adjustment, a wildfire suppression funding scheme is laid out through 
2027.84  The provisions provide that the Wildland Fire Management 
accounts of the Department of Interior and the Department of Agriculture 
shall be funded to an amount of 2.25 billion dollars in the year 2020 and 
shall increase to not more than 2.95 billion dollars in the year 2027.85  
Attached to these funds are several provisions outlining reporting 
requirements; the most important of which will aid in the evaluation of 
“fuel treatments” on fire behavior and suppression expenditures.86  
Additionally, the Act earmarks 2,880,338,000 dollars for varied forest fire 
suppression and forest management activities through September 30, 
2021.87  By dedicating funds expressly for firefighting cost over the next 
nine years, Congress has assured that the Department of Interior and the 
Department of Agriculture can allocate proper funding to the fire 
                                                                 
83.  Id. (citing Senator John McCain’s website, Senators McCain, 
Barrasso and Flake Reintroduce Legislation to Fully Fund Wildfire Suppression and 
Boost Proactive Forest Management (Feb. 13, 2015) (website no longer available). 
84.  H.R. 1625. § 102(a)(3)(F)(i). 
85.  Id. 
86.  H.R. 1625. § 104. 
87. H.R. 1625. § 102. 
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prevention strategies outlined in the HFRA and that those provisions can 
be executed to fullest extent. 
 
2. Substantive Provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2018 
  
 The 2018 Appropriations Act makes a multitude of substantive 
changes and additions to  federal wildfire policy, which are purportedly 
aimed at increasing overall forest health by additional streamlining for 
approval of fuels reduction projects and wildfire resilience projects as well 
as addressing ongoing agency concerns.88  The most notable provision is 
the creation of an additional categorical exclusion, which excludes NEPA 
analysis for Wildfire Resilience Projects.89  These projects are limited in 
size to 3000 acres.90  Each project must provide for the “retention of old-
growth and large trees, as appropriate for the forest type, to the extent that 
the trees promote stands that are resilient to insects and disease, and reduce 
the risk or extent of, or increase the resilience to wildfires,” with priority 
given to projects in the WUI.91  Several safeguard provisions act as the 
stand-in for a NEPA EA or EIS and these include: 
 
(B) consider the best available scientific information to 
maintain or restore the ecological integrity, including 
maintaining and restoring structure, function, 
composition, and connectivity; and 
(C) is developed and implemented through a collaborative 
process that – (i) includes multiple interested persons 
representing diverse interests; and (ii)(I) is transparent 
and nonexclusive; or (II) meets the requirements for a 
resource advisory committee. . . .92 
 
In addition to the CE for Wildfire Resilience Projects, the 2018 
Appropriations Act also contains six other management reforms: (1) 
                                                                 
88. H.R. 1625. §§ 201–212.  
89. H.R. 1625. § 202 (inserting § 605 at the end of Healthy Forests 
Restoration Act and creating an additional CE beyond that established in the 2014 
Farm Bill).  
90. H.R. 1625. § 202(c)(1).  
91. H.R. 1625. §§ 202(b)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A). 
92. H.R. 1625. § 202(b)(1)(B−C). 
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HFRA inclusion for projects building fire and fuel breaks; (2) 20-year 
stewardship contracts; (3) Cottonwood reform; (4) fire hazard mapping 
initiative (5) fuels management for protection of electrical transmission 
lines;  and (6) additions to the good neighbor authority amendment 
originally contained in the 2014 Farm Bill.93  
 The Cottonwood reform provision94 is a targeted response to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Cottonwood Environmental 
Law Center v. United States Forest Service,95 which found that the Forest 
Service is obligated to consult the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
when a critical habitat for an endangered species is defined under the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to determine if the current forest 
management plans will harm the species.96  Under section 208, which 
amends the Consultation Under Forest and Rangeland Renewable 
Resources Planning Act of 1974, consultation is no longer required upon 
the listing of a new species or designation of critical habitat.97  The 
practical result of this change is that agencies—the Forest Service in 
particular—will not have to review the implications of species listing on 
their forest-wide management plans for up to 15 years.98  
 While the funding fix seems to be universally applauded, the 
substantive provisions are being eyed with some skepticism by 
environmental and animal rights groups. The primary points of concern 
for these interest groups are the 3000-acre CE and the Cottonwood reform. 
It is likely that the CE provisions and the Cottonwood reform will be 
judicially challenged.  Prior to the enactment of the HFRA in 2003, the 
Healthy Forest Initiative created five new types of categorical exclusions. 
These categorical exclusions ranged in size from 4500 acres for controlled 
burns, to 1000 acres for mechanical treatments, down to 70 acres for live 
                                                                 
93.  H.R. 1625. §§ 203−212; see also USDA Office of Commc’ns, 
Secretary Perdue Applauds Fire Funding Fix in Omnibus, USDA (March 23, 2018), 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAOC/bulletins/1e46559. 
94. H.R. 1625. § 208. 
95.  789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).  
96.  Jessica Kutz, Fire Funding Fixes Comes With Environmental 
Rollbacks, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (March 29, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/ 
wildfire-fire-funding-fix-includes-environmental-rollbacks. 
97.  H.R. 1625. § 208(a). 
98.  Kutz, supra note 96. 
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tree harvest with incidental live tree removal.99  The largest of these 
exclusions for fuel reduction was challenged in Sierra Club v. Bosworth,100 
and it was invalidated on the grounds that the: 
 
Forest Service failed to engage in the required scoping 
process prior to the CE’s establishment, failed to conduct 
a reasoned cumulative impacts analysis, failed to consider 
the extent to which impact of fuels reduction projects was 
highly controversial and uncertain, and failed to define the 
CE with requisite specificity.101   
 
It is likely that the CE in the 2018 Act would be challengeable on similar 
grounds. Judicial review of the Cottonwood reform would be a case of first 
impression. It seems unlikely that if critical habitat were designated within 
a forest, that a 3000-acre hazardous fuels treatment could occur without a 
NEPA analysis and full consultation under Section 7 of the ESA.  In 
juxtaposition to both of these assertions is the previously mentioned Ilano 
case which found no fault in a CE under the 2014 Farm Bill.  
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
 Congress should be applauded for the recent passage of the fire 
spending provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, 
which were aimed at ending “fire borrowing.”  State, local, and federal fire 
agencies have been calling for an end to “fire borrowing” for many years, 
and the spending allocations will likely be the most successful of the 
wildfire suppression and hazardous fuels management provisions in the 
2018 Appropriations Act.  However, Congress must also assure continued 
significant allocation of funds for hazardous fuels reduction projects and 
other fire fuels management techniques under the general funding of the 
agencies or the fire suppression allocations in the 2018 Appropriations Act 
will be of little significance in the long run.  
  The passage of the additional 3000-acre CE in the 2018 
Appropriations Act was seemingly unnecessary and largely politically 
driven.  It is redundant because it is essentially a duplication of the CE 
                                                                 
99.  SANDRA B. ZELLMER & JAN G. LAITOS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
RESOURCE LAW, 252 (2014).  
100. 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007).  
101.  ZELLMER & LAITOS, supra note 99 at 252. 
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previously passed in the 2014 Farm Bill and included in the HFRA, with 
the exception that some parameters enumerated in the 2014 provisions 
have been removed in the 2018 iteration.  The primary difference is the 
2018 CE is not focused exclusively on disease infestations and will open 
areas of the forest that are simply at high fire risk.  Additionally, while 
projects are to be prioritized in the WUI, that provision is non-binding and 
Wildfire Resilience projects under the new CE can be carried out 
anywhere in the approximately 58 million acres of National Forest Service 
lands that have been identified as at very high fire risk or in an insect 
infestations area.102  There is no doubt that huge expanses of western forest 
are in extremely poor health and in need of immediate attention, but the 
2018 CE is step backward in forest policy and away from the original 
controlling acts that recognized the importance of forest-wide planning.  
By expanding the use CE’s to arguably all areas of the forest, the purpose 
of NEPA has been largely negated and the “basic legal framework for 
federal forest management” has been changed.103  Allowing forest 
management decisions to be made 3000 acres at a time forgets the history 
of the United States forest reserves, which propelled forest management 
plans to look forest-wide.   
 Ultimately, the looming question is: has the use of CEs become 
too widespread in forest management and exceeded the scope and purpose 
for which CEs were created in the first place?  This is not a novel question 
and has been covered at length in legal literature.104  In 2010, the Executive 
Office of the President and the Council on Environmental Quality issued 
guidance to aid  federal agencies in determining when CEs are 
appropriate.105 This press release noted, “categorical exclusions are 
                                                                 
102. Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 46 at 38. 
103. Id. (citing S. HRG. 115-112 (e.g., letter submitted by Center for 
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appropriate in many circumstances but should not be relied on if they 
thwart the purposes of NEPA, compromising the quality and transparency 
of agency decision making or the opportunity for meaningful public 
participation.”106  While the need to move forest management projects 
through the permitting process expeditiously is readily apparent, the 2018 
CE seems to be largely intended to allow the Forest Service to 
circumnavigate NEPA’s requirements and should likely be found invalid.  
Creation of CEs are an understandable expression of frustration to the 
delays NEPA causes, but a more appropriate approach is to amend NEPA 
to legislatively resolve its problems.  By eliminating excessively large EAs 
and EISs and indefinitely long evaluation time frames, returning to 
development of simplified EAs and EISs, and potentially restricting 
litigation through a process similar to that outlined in the HFRA, the 
original intention of NEPA can be preserved.107  
 CE projects initiated under the 2018 Appropriations Act will 
likely be susceptible to judicial challenge, as they were in Sierra Club v. 
Bosworth108 and Center for Biological Diversity, et. al. v. Eli Ilano, et. 
al.109    This will only serve to shift attention and resources away from the 
reduction of fire fuels hazards and fire suppression efforts.  The success of 
these suits will hinge, in part, on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the 
pending appeal of Ilano.  Furthermore, the need for the additional CE was 
questionable as HFRA projects, 2014 Farm Bill CE projects, and regular 
NEPA evaluated projects were being adequately implemented prior to the 
2018 Appropriations Act.110 Finally, the creation of the 2018 CE may 
incentivize logging and thinning projects on  federal and Forest Service 
lands not in the critical WUI area, which is not where these projects will 
reap the most benefit.  
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 This last fact raises the question: will critical funding get to the 
WUI and the agencies most in need of help reducing hazardous fuels and 
wildfire risk in urban areas? Unfortunately,  federal lands do not typically 
fall within the WUI; therefore, spending capital and human resources 
conducting fuel reduction projects on  federal lands may not be the best 
approach to reduce the increasing cost of wildfire suppression.111  While 
the applicable statutes and acts statutorily provide for resource sharing 
between the Forest Service, other agencies, and states, funding allocations 
do not show significant funds moving beyond the Forest Service or the 
Department of Interior. An addendum to a 2013 study on the rising cost of 
fires notes: 
 
Of the $3.33 billion in average annual federal wildfire 
funding since 2002, 91 percent has been used for 
protecting federal lands; more than 70 percent of the 
funding for federal land protection has been appropriated 
to the FS, with just less than 30 percent appropriated to 
DOI. Nearly 7 percent has been used for wildfire 
protection assistance to state and local governments; 65 
percent of assistance funding has been through the FS, 
and 32 percent has been through FEMA, with DOI 
providing 3 percent.112 
 
Until funds move to the entities most likely to affect change in the WUI, 
it is unlikely that substantive changes in policy will be effective at 
decreasing fire severity, size, cost, and threat to communities.  
 Because FLAME laid the groundwork and completed the 
extensive planning required to implement a cohesive wildland fire 
strategy, Congress may have missed an opportunity in the 2018 
Appropriations Act to fund and implement projects that would have 
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utilized the information and planning synthesized in the creation of 
FLAME’s comprehensive strategy.  Had Congress assured that resources 
were allocated to areas in WUI, where they would have the greatest effect 
on mitigating the increased cost of battling modern wildfires, the long-
term effects of their actions would have perhaps been more effective than 
implementing an additional CE.  The cost of rebuilding the 12,000 homes 
lost in the 2017 fire season has been estimated at 25 billion dollars, 
FLAME could have provided the information and planning to assure that 
resources would be allocated to those areas with the highest likelihood of 
controlling these cost.113  By turning its back on FLAME in favor of the 
NEPA shortcuts that CEs create, Congress has perpetuated the ill-
conceived mindset that wildfire management is better served by short-term 
gains than by long-term strategic planning.       
 The Cottonwood reform contained in the 2018 Appropriations Act 
is difficult to reconcile with the overarching purpose of the ESA.  While 
proponents of the fix assert that Section 7 consultation must still occur 
before a project under a forest plan can move forward, this approach seems 
to look past the need to reconcile the activities outlined in a forest plan 
with the needs of a listed species or its critical habitat.114  The Cottonwood 
provision takes a cart before the horse approach to the ESA. Instead of 
defining a forest wide plan appropriate to the species or habitat listing and 
then recommending projects that fall within that plan’s parameters, the 
Cottonwood provision would allow for projects to be brought forth for 
Section 7 consultation that are in accordance with the outdated plan but 
not in line with the ESA or the species needs.  The Cottonwood Court’s 
determination is a more logical approach to reconciling forest-wide plans 
with ESA determinations.   
 Finally, none of the approaches addressed in 2018 Appropriations 
Act presented the solution of incentivizing increased land use planning.  
While this approach tasks local communities with facilitating the required 
changes, it could be subsidized by federal funds.  Until living and building 
in the WUI is disincentivized, the cost of suppressing wildfires will likely 
continue to climb.  These land use policies could take on several different 
forms, including: requirements to accomplish fuel mitigation prior to 
building; prohibitions on certain building materials; additional insurance 
                                                                 
113.  Kyle Dickman, What If Our Forest Don’t Come Back, OUTSIDE 
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requirements for structures in the WUI; and finally, a waiver of public 
firefighting services for structures built within the WUI.  This approach 
would likely be the most successful at stemming future increases in 
suppression costs, but it may also be the hardest to accomplish politically.  
 While the “fire borrowing” fix in the 2018 Appropriations Act was 
commendable, by passing the substantive appropriation’s riders in the 
2018 Appropriations Act, Congress has turned its back on cohesive forest 
management in favor of a piecemeal approach.  The Cottonwood reform 
the CEs, and the lack of commitment to the comprehensive strategy 
outlined in FLAME will only serve to cause disjointed forest and fire 
suppression policy moving forward.  Instead of promoting forward-
looking, collaboration-building, and cohesive approaches, Congress has 
written an open discretionary check to the Forest Service and other  federal 
agencies to do as they please without sufficient planning.  This approach 
will likely result in increased litigation and little real change in fire 
suppression cost and efficacy.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 As one Forest Service Report notes: “a solution will not happen 
overnight.”115  The unintended consequences of a century of fire 
suppression success can likely not be unwound in as little as ten years. 
Cohesive planning and perseverance are likely all that will solve this 
critical problem.  By focusing efforts and funding on the WUI and 
allocating resources to those agencies most likely to affect change in the 
WUI, reduction of fire suppression cost can likely occur.  However, 
climate change and decreased forest health may require agencies to adopt 
new strategies for forest management outside the WUI.  These 
management plans should be promulgated under the original policy 
intentions of NFMA and NEPA, which required a sensible whole forest, 
multiple use approach to management with consideration of multiple 
alternatives.  Finally, Congress should attempt to consolidate fire 
suppression policy under one comprehensive plan, which would utilize the 
years of research and planning already implemented.     
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